本月最多人看的書

2012年9月7日 星期五

錢買不到:市場的道德界線 What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets

 《正義:一場思辨之旅》哈佛大學有史以來最受歡迎的課程之一,Sandel 教授以一則則艱難的道德困境故事,讓學生思考「怎麼做才正確?」的信念。現在,他提出了更難以回答、更貼近我們日常生活的另一個大哉問,再一次挑戰每個人的腦與心。

我們生活在一個市場導向的時代,民主成了資本主義擴張的後盾,簡單的說,用錢幾乎可以買到任何東西、促成任何事。但是,這真的正確嗎?我們應該付錢讓兒童閱讀,獲得好成績嗎?我們應該向企業收取大氣的除污費用,卻讓大企業覺得付錢就能繼續排放廢氣嗎?雇用傭兵替我們打仗、拍賣菁英大學的入學權,這些到底是對還是錯?

錢,不能買到什麼?或不該買到什麼?是 Michael Sandel 教授認為我們面臨最大的道德問題之一,「一個用錢能買到任何東西的世界」究竟正不正確?我們是否應該畫下一條界限,讓生活中的某些部分無法用金錢衡量?換句話說,商品市場的道德界限在哪裡?

如同《正義》一書與課程,這是另一場艱難的思辨之旅,沒有標準答案。每位閱讀此書的讀者,都將被挑戰既有的預設立場,以及思維模式,或許會讓讀者在買與賣任何東西之前,多思索一下金錢與道德之間的糾結關係。我們的社會、法律以及生活方式,就在讀者遲疑的那兩秒之中,往正確的方向多走了一步。

當然,買這本書與閱讀它,無需遲疑,也沒有任何道德問題。

作者  /  Michael J. Sandel 邁可.桑德爾
出版社 / PENGUIN BOOKS LTD.
出版日期 / 2012/04/01


 




芝加哥——

  在迈克尔•桑德尔(Michael Sandel)颇有意思的新书《钱买不到的:市场的道德边界》(What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of the Market)中,这位哈佛大学哲学家提到了许多在现代社会中可以用金钱买到的东西,然后优雅地煽风点火哦,激发我们对市场主宰一切的愤怒。我们真的应该引起警惕吗?

  桑德尔担心某些货币化交易的腐败性质(真的可以用悬赏开发孩子的阅读兴趣吗?),但他也担心金钱获得渠道的不平等性,因为这导致了用钱进行的贸易具有内在不平等性。更一般地讲,桑德尔担心匿名货币交换的扩张会侵蚀社会凝聚力,并呼吁减弱金钱在社会中的作用。

  桑德尔的担忧算不上最新鲜,但他举的例子值得我们深思。在美国,一些公司花钱雇失业者排队抢过会听证的公共入场券。接着,他们把入场券卖给游说集团和公司律师——听证对事关后两者的利益,但他们又太忙,没有时间排队。

  显然,公共听证是参与性民主的重要元素。所有公民都应该有平等的参与权。因此出售参与权似乎是对民主原则的滥用。

  但是,根本问题出在稀缺上。我们无法协调可能在某个重要听证上存在利益的所有人。因此,我们不得不“出售”参与权。我们可以让人们牺牲时间排队换取听证席位,也可以将听证权拿来拍卖换钱。前者比较公平,因为似乎所有公民的初始时间禀赋都是一样的。但是,可以说一位从事高压力工作还带着三个幼儿的单身母亲的闲暇禀赋和一位放暑假的学生是一样的吗?而作为某大公司首席法律顾问的这位单身母亲花时间排队能产生让社会变得更好的效果吗?

  用时间还是用金钱换取入场券孰优孰劣取决于我们希望达到的目的是什么。如果我们希望增加社会生产率,那么人们愿意付多少钱可以作为合理的指标显示他们可以从参与听证中获得多少好处。货币拍卖听证席位是有用的——律师准备总结陈词对社会的贡献大于排队。

  另一方面,如果重点在于让年轻、敏感的公民体验他们身处其中的民主是如何运转的,以及通过让公司高管与失业年轻人一起排队培养社会凝聚力,那么就应该迫使人们牺牲时间换取不可转移的入场券。但如果我们两个目标——效率和凝聚力都应该起作用,也许我们应该对繁忙的律师雇用失业者替自己排队的现象睁一只眼闭一只眼,只要他们被霸占所有席位。

  那么贩卖人体器官又该怎么看呢?这是桑德尔所担心的又一件事。卖肾或者卖肺听起来似乎总有那么一丝不对劲。但对于捐献肾脏给年轻小孩的陌生人,我们总要赞扬他的善良。因此,显然,是器官的交易激怒了我们——我们并不会去想捐献者被误导了肾脏的价值,或是受骗上当才接受取肾的。而我认为,我们也不会去想出售器官者所经历的犹豫——毕竟他们所经历的是与宝贵之物的不可逆的分离,而他们所获得的代价是很少有人愿意能够的。

  我想,我们的不满部分是来自交易发生的环境。如果一个人得出售器官才活得下去,那么我们生活在其中的是怎样一个社会啊!

  但是,尽管禁止贩卖器官会让我们感觉好受些,这真的能让社会变得更好吗?也许是,如果这能让社会变得更努力从而确保人们永远不会陷入被诱出售活体器官的境况中去的话。但也可能不是,如果社会并没有意识到基本问题,而是将器官贩卖行为转入地下并迫使出售器官者得不到更好医疗的话。

  再一次,我们的不安可能部分来自我们对不公平交换的定义。出售者在一次不可逆的交易中放弃了身体的一部分。购买者只放弃了金钱——这笔钱可能来自某次撞大运的炒股或薪酬过高的工作。如果这笔钱本身便来自出售一部分肺脏,或是多年来辛勤劳作、一分一厘苦苦储蓄而得,我们或许会觉得这样的交换会公平些。

  当然,钱最核心的优点正在于其匿名性。我不需要知道拿到的美元钞票的相关信息就可以使用它。但是,匿名性使得我们无从考证钱的来源,而对于某些目标,这会导致人们对钱作为支付中介的角色难以接受。

  在上述两例中——国会入场券和贩卖器官——桑德尔都建议减弱钱的作用。但钱在促进交易和使用范围方面有着大量好处。因此,也许更重要的问题在于社会对货币化的容忍度与源自金钱分配的合理性成正比。

  人们越是认为多劳多能者才能多得,就越是愿意忍受金钱交易(尽管仍有某些交易超出了仍受界限)。但如果人们认为关系最多、人品最劣者往往最能致富,那么他们对货币交易的容忍度也会下降。

  不要将注意力放在禁止货币交易上。也许桑德尔的例子给我们的更重要的教训是我们应该不断改善对金钱分配的合理性的感觉。

  拉古兰•拉贾是前IMF首席经济学家,芝加哥大学布斯商学院金融学教授,著有《断层线:隐藏裂痕如何继续影响世界经济》  

By Raghuram Rajan

CHICAGO - In an interesting recent book, What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of the Market, the Harvard philosopher Michael Sandel points to the range of things that money can buy in modern societies and gently tries to stoke our outrage at the market's growing dominance. Is he right that we should be alarmed?

While Sandel worries about the corrupting nature of some monetized transactions (do kids really develop a love of reading if they are bribed to read books?), he is also concerned about unequal access to money, which makes trades using money inherently unequal. More generally, he fears that the expansion of anonymous monetary exchange erodes social cohesion, and argues for reducing money's role in society.

Sandel's concerns are not entirely new, but his examples are worth reflecting upon. In the United States, some companies pay the unemployed to stand in line for free public tickets to congressional hearings. They then sell the tickets to lobbyists and corporate lawyers who have a business interest in the hearing but are too busy to stand in line.

Clearly, public hearings are an important element of participatory democracy. All citizens should have equal access. So selling access seems to be a perversion of democratic principles.

The fundamental problem, though, is scarcity. We cannot accommodate everyone in the room who might have an interest in a particularly important hearing. So we have to "sell" entry. We can either allow people to use their time (standing in line) to bid for seats, or we can auction seats for money. The former seems fairer, because all citizens seemingly start with equal endowments of time. But is a single mother with a high-pressure job and three young children as equally endowed with spare time as a student on summer vacation? And is society better off if she, the chief legal counsel for a large corporation, spends much of her time standing in line?

Whether it is better to sell entry tickets for time or for money thus depends on what we hope to achieve. If we want to increase society's productive efficiency, people's willingness to pay with money is a reasonable indicator of how much they will gain if they have access to the hearing. Auctioning seats for money makes sense - the lawyer contributes more to society by preparing briefs than by standing in line.

On the other hand, if it is important that young, impressionable citizens see how their democracy works, and that we build social solidarity by making corporate executives stand in line with jobless teenagers, it makes sense to force people to bid with their time and to make entry tickets non-transferable. But if we think that both objectives - efficiency and solidarity - should play some role, perhaps we should turn a blind eye to hiring the unemployed to stand in line in lieu of busy lawyers, so long as they do not corner all of the seats.

What about the sale of human organs, another example Sandel worries about? Something seems wrong when a lung or a kidney is sold for money. Yet we celebrate the kindness of a stranger who donates a kidney to a young child. So, clearly, it is not the transfer of the organ that outrages us - we do not think that the donor is misinformed about the value of a kidney or is being fooled into parting with it. Nor, I think, do we have concerns about the scruples of the person selling the organ - after all, they are parting irreversibly with something that is dear to them for a price that few of us would accept.

I think part of our discomfort has to do with the circumstances in which the transaction takes place. What kind of society do we live in if people have to sell their organs to survive?

But, while a ban on organ sales may make us feel better, does it really make society better off? Possibly, if it makes society work harder to ensure that people are never driven to the circumstances that would make them contemplate selling a vital organ. But possibly not, if it allows society to ignore the underlying problem, either moving the trade underground, or forcing people in such circumstances to resort to worse remedies.

Then again, part of our unease probably has to do with what we perceive as an unequal exchange. The seller is giving up part of her body in an irreversible transaction. The buyer is giving up only money - perhaps earned on a lucky stock trade or at an overpaid job. If that money had been earned by selling a portion of a lung, or represented savings painfully accumulated during years of backbreaking work, we might consider the exchange more equal.

Of course, the central virtue of money is precisely its anonymity. I need know nothing about the dollar bill I receive to be able to use it. But, because money's anonymity obscures its provenance, it may be socially less acceptable as a medium of payment for some objects.

In both examples - congressional tickets and organ sales - Sandel suggests reducing money's role. But money has many virtues in facilitating transactions - hence its ubiquitous use. So, perhaps the more important message is that society's tolerance for monetization is proportional to the legitimacy accorded to the distribution of money.

The more people believe that it is the hardworking and the deserving who have money, the more they are willing to tolerate transactions for money (though some transactions remain beyond the pale). But if people believe that the moneyed are primarily those who are well connected or crooked, their tolerance for monetary transactions falls.

Rather than focusing on prohibiting monetary transactions, perhaps a more important lesson imparted by Sandel's examples is that we should work continuously to improve the perceived legitimacy of money's distribution.

Raghuram Rajan, a former chief economist of the IMF, is Professor of Finance at the University of Chicago's Booth School of Business and the author of Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy.
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